Introduction by Richard Arena & Agnès Festré
1. Introduction
  Richard Arena and Agnès Festré
The role played by the notion of belief in modern economics is somewhat 
paradoxical. On the one hand, it is clearly and increasingly gaining 
prominence in most ﬁ  elds of contemporary analysis, such as decision 
theory, price theory, ﬁ  nance, game theory, information theory, sunspot 
theory, economics of the mind and organization theory. On the other 
hand, this popularity stands in stark contrast to the lack of precision that 
characterizes the concept of belief within economics. The paradox could 
be easily dismissed by arguing that belief shares the fate of many other 
concepts encountered in modern economic analysis: the more they are used, 
the less they are precise. The reasons for this tendency are certainly complex 
and we shall not attempt to tackle them here. Sufﬁ  ce it to say that a more 
general and systematic reﬂ  ection on the role of beliefs in economics still 
needs to be carried out, especially given that by doing so our knowledge 
of many economic phenomena and their interactive mechanisms would 
certainly increase.
It is by no mere accident that beliefs have come to occupy an increasingly 
prominent place in modern economics. This is the result of the inﬂ  uence 
of three current strains of modern economic thought, all affecting our 
representation of economic agents and of economic forms of rationality. 
The progressive decline of the General Equilibrium research programme 
substantially changed the idea of economic equilibrium that prevailed 
among economists during the ﬁ  rst two decades following the second world 
war. Until the 1970s, economists assimilated the micro-coordination issue 
into the problem of the co-ordination of individual agents in interacting 
markets through a unique central co-ordination mechanism (the well-known 
‘tâtonnement’ process – see, for instance, Arrow and Hahn, Chap. 11, esp. 
pp. 264–70). As the General Equilibrium agenda came to be replaced by 
a research programme based on the theories of games and information 
the landscape changed. Strategies came into the picture and these had to 
be based on mutual and rational knowledge and beliefs. Brieﬂ  y speaking, 
a new view of micro-coordination emerged, which was no longer forced 
to rely on the analytical assumption of centralized markets. However, the 
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introduction of this new view was confronted with a difﬁ  culty, which both 
Morgenstern (1935) and Hayek (1937) had already emphasized in the 
interwar years. Given that agents interact in all economic systems their 
decisions are at least partially based on the forecasts they are able to make 
in relation to the expected behaviour of other agents. Now, if we accept the 
assumption that these decisions and forecasts must be rational, a logical 
problem arises. In order to display rational micro-behaviours, agents must 
acquire some knowledge of the beliefs and information of other economic 
agents. However, it is clear that part of this information and beliefs also 
depend on their own knowledge and beliefs. A problem of logical circularity 
thus arises, which game theory tried to solve.
While all these developments were taking place, substantial work was also 
being carried out in an attempt to better understand the processes leading 
to equilibrium. This work gave rise to the competing ideas of ‘eductive’ and 
‘evolutionary’ processes (see the contributions of Guesnerie and Walliser 
in this volume). Eductive processes are processes in which an equilibrium 
state stems solely from the reasoning of hyper-intelligent players who share 
a common knowledge of the game structure and of their rationality (see the 
introductory part of Walliser’s contribution to this volume). By contrast, 
evolutionary processes are those in which an equilibrium state results 
from the convergence of a learning or an evolutionary process followed 
by players with bounded rationality but mindful of previous play (ibid). 
Evolutionary mechanisms have many variations. Despite this diversity, 
they all share a form of rationality which is radically different from the 
one featured in eductive models. Evolutionary models exclude a ‘strong’ 
form of rationality, which allows agents to have direct access – i.e. through 
purely mental means and independently of any form of social interaction 
– to the common knowledge of the structure of the economic system and 
of the rationality of other agents. In fact, ‘evolutionary’ decisions take into 
account beliefs founded only on the knowledge of past individual actions 
and observed forms of social interaction. This means that agents contribute 
to the generation of inter-individual evolutionary mechanisms which they 
ignored ex ante. However, this type of individual learning does not imply 
a strong knowledge of the strategic neighbourhood of agents and most 
importantly it does not require knowledge of the overall consequences such 
mechanisms have on the whole economic system. 
The increasing attention paid to the notion of agent heterogeneity 
also substantially contributed to the emergence of the notion of belief in 
economic theory. We are all very well aware of the theoretical limits imposed 
by the treatment of agents and individual rationality in General Equilibrium 
theory with complete markets or by the use of the idea of a representative 
agent. These limits clearly derive from the assumption of agent homogeneity. 
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Various attempts have been made to relax it, putting various forms of 
heterogeneity in its place. For instance, the pioneering works of Radner 
and Hahn, mentioned by Guesnerie in this volume, used information to 
characterize the heterogeneity of individual agents in different situations. 
They showed how different individual information sets and different micro 
forecast structures allowed for the characterization of agent ‘speciﬁ  cities’ 
in relation to, but quite independently of, their particular preferences and 
initial endowments. Agent heterogeneity based on information speciﬁ  cities 
is commonplace within game theory: agents differ depending on the nature 
of their knowledge and the structure of their beliefs.
The assumption of agent heterogeneity is not, however, the result of 
modern analytical developments. General Equilibrium and game theory 
only revived an assumption that has been present in economic theory for a 
long time. For instance, as Loasby in this volume shows, Alfred Marshall 
insisted on the temporal variability of the nature and economic preferences 
of men as well as the variety of their types of knowledge. Orléan’s chapter 
in this volume also shows how Keynes emphasized the diversity of agent 
beliefs and expectations in ﬁ  nancial markets and studied how this diversity 
could be reduced through the emergence of market conventions. Finally, 
as Arena and Festré note in their chapter, the Austrian tradition delved 
deeply into the fundamental heterogeneity of agents’ subjective beliefs and 
knowledge as well as the contrast between ‘innovative’ and ‘imitative’ types 
of behaviour. 
The increasing presence of the concept of belief in contemporary 
economics is also due to the recent simultaneous but distinct rise of the 
theory of ‘knowledge-based economies’ and of the ‘economics of the mind’. 
The former focuses on the role played by the concept of tacit knowledge in 
innovation processes or entrepreneurial decisions. We are all very well aware 
of the way in which this concept is connected to the structure of knowledge 
and beliefs of the different agents and communities within particular ﬁ  rms 
(see also the chapters of Cohendet and Diani, Loasby, Arena and Festré, 
Ngo-Maï and Raybaut in this volume). 
‘Economics of the mind’ provides a new kind of explanation of decision 
making, the formation of rules and market interaction. First, it shows how 
decision making cannot be limited to the ﬁ  eld of expected utility theory, 
as Boudon sets out in this volume. Secondly, the degree of conﬁ  dence of 
agents in their own beliefs and therefore belief updating also require serious 
consideration – as the contribution of Tallon and Vergnaud shows. Thirdly, 
a convergent pre-existing path does not predeﬁ  ne rule formation as Novarese 
and Rizzello argue. Finally, market interaction cannot be reduced to the 
study of the properties of equilibrium states but implies an analysis of the 
relationship between individual behaviour, beliefs and market organization, 
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as stressed in the contributions of both Orléan and Ngo-Maï and Raybaut 
in this volume. 
As we just noted, the concept of beliefs plays an increasingly important 
role in the recent advances of economics and especially of game theory (see, 
for instance, the contributions of both Schmidt and Tallon and Vergnaud in 
this volume). These advances must not hide however that it is also crucial to 
identify the main analytical problems that the introduction of this concept 
has brought along. 
The ﬁ  rst problem that arises is the compatibility between economic 
rationality and a serious attempt to take individual beliefs into account. Even 
if economic rationality cannot be reduced to its instrumental dimension, it 
is clear that, very often, this ﬁ  rst problem is reduced to the question of the 
compatibility between the existence of beliefs and the theory of the rational 
choice. If one takes this reductionist approach, the main problem following 
the introduction of the concept of beliefs in economics can be identiﬁ  ed 
with the search of the logical conditions necessary to deﬁ  ne rational and 
consistent beliefs. 
The requirement of instrumental rationality implies a strict separation 
of the spheres of the preference system, of the rules of the game and of 
the scheme of beliefs. The usual preference system must remain unchanged 
after the inclusion of the inﬂ  uence of individual beliefs on the process of 
economic choices. Technically, agents must still have a preference ordering 
because it is only when preferences are ordered that agents will be able 
to begin to form beliefs about how different actions can satisfy their 
preferences in different degrees. The rules of the game must be deﬁ  ned 
perfectly independently of both the preference system and the scheme of 
beliefs. In order to fulﬁ  l this condition, individuals are assumed to know the 
rules of the game perfectly, i.e., they are assumed to know all the possible 
actions and how these combine to yield particular pay-offs for each agent. 
In the context of game theory, this assumption obviously implies the notion 
of common knowledge. Individual motives for choosing speciﬁ  c actions 
must also be independent from the rules of the game, which structure the 
set of possible actions.
The requirement of consistency implies a characterization of the scheme 
of beliefs that allows the formation of an equilibrium ensuring the com-
patibility of different individual schemes. One of the ﬁ  rst consequences of 
this requirement is the deﬁ  nition of the concept of belief within economic 
theory. For instance, as noted by Guesnerie in this volume, the requirement 
of consistency in the tradition of General Equilibrium theory implies the 
assimilation of individual beliefs to pure probabilistic expectations on future 
prices. In the same way, Walliser’s distinction between ‘structural’, ‘factual’ 
and ‘strategic’ beliefs appears to be a prerequisite of the condition of con-
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sistency. Clearly, this ﬁ  rst problem disappears if we decide to drop the theory 
of rational choice and tackle the consistency requirement in a different way. 
This however does not imply that new problems will not emerge.
The second problem is related to what Hargreaves Heap and Varoufakis 
(2004) call the notion of ‘consistent alignment of beliefs’, which, according 
to them, ‘means that no instrumentally rational person can expect another 
similarly rational person who has the same information to develop different 
thought processes’ (Hargreaves Heap and Varoufakis 2004, p. 28). From this 
standpoint, ‘your beliefs about what your opponent will do are consistently 
aligned in the sense that if you actually knew what her plans were, you would 
not want to change your beliefs about those plans. And if she knew your 
plans, she would not want to change the beliefs she holds about you and 
which support her own planned actions.’ (ibid. p. 28). This notion implies 
the reduction of all agent reasonableness to strict instrumental rationality. 
It contradicts Boudon’s argument (in this volume), which supports the 
idea that there exist rational beliefs that are not founded on the search for 
self-interest, that are not consequentialist and that do not require a cost-
beneﬁ  t calculation. It also obviously contrasts with pragmatist views that 
see beliefs as the establishment of a certain habit determining the way in 
which agents will act when appropriately stimulated. This deﬁ  nition implies 
that the various individual habits related to different individual beliefs can 
correspond to various ‘good reasons’. 
A third problem concerns the relations between the individual and 
the collective dimensions of beliefs. According to standard economic 
theory, it is clear that all social relations, institutions or structures derive 
from interactions between initially and ex-ante asocial agents. From this 
standpoint, collective magnitudes or structures do not exist as such but are 
only the result of the aggregation of microeconomic magnitudes: Guesnerie 
and Walliser’s contributions stress this particular feature of modern 
mainstream economic theory. Although this is the predominant conception, 
others are conceivable. Orléan and Ngo-Maï and Raybaut’s chapters share 
the idea that there exist collective beliefs which cannot be reduced to pure 
shared beliefs. This viewpoint always presupposes some autonomy of 
social entities vis-à-vis microeconomic behaviours. An interesting example 
is provided by ‘team thinking’: in this case, collective intentionality (see, for 
instance, Gilbert 1989 and Tuomela 1995) replaces individual intentionality 
and some behavioural autonomy is attributed to the team considered as 
a whole. Another example is provided by Keynes’ typology of beliefs (see 
Arena 2004). In the Treatise on Probability, certain beliefs are assimilated to 
pure knowledge. They correspond to cases in which the ‘weight’ of argument 
is related to the maximum ‘degree of rational beliefs’. Rational beliefs are 
tantamount to probabilistic beliefs; they correspond to the situation in 








































86  Knowledge, beliefs and economics
which the weight of argument is associated to an intermediate ‘degree’. 
Now, non–rational beliefs correspond to collective or conventional beliefs. 
In this last case, the weight or argument tends to zero and real knowledge 
is replaced by collective beliefs elaborated thanks to the interaction between 
agents. These beliefs are the result of a social convention, which creates 
what can be called collective knowledge. 
As described earlier, the compatibility between the rational theory of choice 
and the introduction of beliefs presupposes the independence of preference 
sets, schemes of beliefs and rules of the game. Recent developments in the 
new ﬁ  eld of ‘psychological games’ (Hargreaves Heap and Varoufakis 2004, 
Chapter 7) suggest that this independence could be abandoned (see also 
Schmidt’s contribution in this volume). From this standpoint, beliefs could 
be directly related to and constitute the agents’ preferences, a position that 
could imply the abandonment of the strict separation of preferences from 
the rules of the game. Alternatively, it could also be possible to start from 
some social practices or shared rules (as Hargreaves Heap and Varoufakis 
2004 remind us, Wittgenstein related them to what he called ‘forms of life’) 
and derive preferences and rules mutually and simultaneously from them. In 
this context, the agents’ perception of their preferences is ill-deﬁ  ned before 
the game is played and instrumental rationality must be deﬁ  ned after the 
characterization of prevailing norms of behaviour, as it appears in Novarese 
and Rizzello’s chapter in this volume. This route is new to game theory and 
only appears in its most advanced developments (see the contribution of 
Schmidt in this volume). 
However, its way had already been paved by older approaches. For 
instance, pragmatist thinkers in the social sciences related individual and 
collective beliefs directly to social rules. A good example can be found in 
Peirce’s process of ‘ﬁ  xation of beliefs’. Most of the methods he described 
in order to determine agent beliefs (the ‘method of tenacity’, the method 
of ‘authority’ and the ‘a priori method’, see Peirce 1897/1966, pp. 101–12) 
generate beliefs which can be true or false, instrumentally rational or non-
rational. However, they allow the elimination of what Peirce called states of 
doubt (Peirce [1897] 1966, pp. 98–101) and the discomfort that is associated 
with them. The last method of ﬁ  xation of beliefs analysed by Peirce is 
the ‘scientiﬁ  c method’. This method clearly differs from the ﬁ  rst three in 
that the ﬁ  xation of beliefs is no longer a purely human endeavour, in the 
sense that the ideas that are ﬁ  xed are ultimately determined by what we 
wish to believe. Therefore, it proceeds from the recognition that nature 
does not accommodate itself to agents’ beliefs but that agents’ beliefs must 
accommodate themselves to nature. In other words, according to this last 
method, as Peirce would have it, preferences and beliefs are, to a large extent, 
constituted by social rules and practices. Another example could be provided 








































8 Introduction  7
by the second Wittgenstein who, in his Philosophical Investigations, criticizes 
the idea of a strict separation of action from shared rules. Shared rules 
limit what can be done but it makes no sense to think of them as distinct 
from actions since they are also enabling. Rules cannot be understood 
independently of the actions which exemplify them. Actions and belief 
structures are, therefore, mutually constituted in the agents practices of a 
given society or a given economy. 
These insights show how much work still needs to be done. A serious 
investigation of beliefs within economics seems to imply the need for a 
multidisciplinary approach. This is why this book includes contributions 
related to various disciplines such as mathematical economics, history of 
economic thought, economic analysis, experimental economics, sociology, 
social philosophy and economic methodology. We hope it will be interpreted 
more as an incentive to further research on the role of knowledge and beliefs 
in economics than as a ﬁ  nal assessment of what has already been done.
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